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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH

'

Respondent,
-vs. RAY CLARENCE RASMUSSEN ,

Case No.

10475

Appellant.
RAY CLARENCE RASMUSSEN,
- vs. -

Appellant,

Case No.

GEORGE BECKSTEAD, Sheriff of
Salt Lake County, Utah,
Respondent.

10426

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE

Ray Clarence Rasmussen was convicted of the
crime of second degree burglary upon jury trial
in the District Court of Salt Lake County on July
26 and 27, 1965. On July 26, 1965, the appellant filed
a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the District
Court of the Third Judicial District, which petition
for writ of habeas corpus was denied by the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, who sat as trial judge on
the appellant's subsequent trial on the charge of
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second degree burglary. From
petition for writ of habeas corpus
of the second degree burglary
lant has prosecuted this appeal.
consolidated for appeal.

the denial of the
and the conviction
charge the appelBoth matters were

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged with the crime of
burglary in the second degree and arraigned in
the District Court of Salt Lake County on June 2,
1965. He subsequently filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus on July 21, 1965, on the grounds that
he was denied a speedy trial. The petition for writ
of habeas corpus was heard on the 26th day of
July, 1965, and denied by the Honorable Aldon
J. Anderson. Judge Anderson had theretofore on
the 22nd day of July, 1965, denied a motion to &r:;miss for want of a speedy trial. The appellant was
brought to trial on July 26, 1965, and on July 27,
1965, was convicted and committed to the Utah
State Prison.
The respondent will adopt the references to
the record as follows:
Habeas corpus record - HCR
Appeal record - R

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the decision of
the trial court in each instance should be affirmed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statement of facts:
The appellant was arrested on April 3, 196.S,
and confined in the Salt Lake County Jail (HCR 1).
He was arraigned in the District Court of Salt Lake
County on the charge of second degree burglary
on June 2, 1965. At the time of his arraignment, he
was still confined in the Salt Lake County Jail and
could not make bond (R 16).
His trial was set for June 15, 1965. The appellant contends that an oral demand for a speedy
trial was made on June 15, 1965, which was the
date originally set for trial. The case was not tried
on June 15, 1965, because an automobile homicide
case which was being tried was not finished (R 41).
The case was thereafter set for trial on July 2, 196~.
The case had been set for third place setting on
June 15, 1965, and, consequently, when the automobile homicide case was not finished, was nor
tried (HCR 24 and R 41 ).
On July 2, 1965, the case was postponed because Judge Ray Van Cott, Jr., the judge assigned
to hear the case, became ill and was unable to
handle the matter (R 41). On July 13, 1965, the appellant filed a written motion for a speedy trial
(R 8 and HCR 19). The case was apparently set for
the 21st day of July, 1965, but the Salt Lake Legal
Defender's Office was not ready to try the case
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because of an apparent failure to receive notice
(R 39).

On July 21, 1965, the same day that the prosecution had been ready to go forward with the case
against the appellant, the appellant filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus, seeking release from the
custody of George Beckstead, Sheriff of Salt Lake
County, on the grounds that he was being denied
a speedy trial (HCR 1). On July 22, 1965, a hearing
was held before the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson,
District Judge, on a motion of the appellant to dismiss the charges for want of a speedy trial (R 37).
I udge Anderson denied the motion to dismiss based
upon representations of counsel as to the relevant
facts. It was stipulated by counsel for the State
and the appellant that the failure to try the appe!lant at any of the times set was no fault of the court
or the district attorney. This is acknowledged on
page 4 of the appellant's brief.
Prior to the appellant's trial on the 26th day
of July, 1965, the date Judge Anderson set for the
trial denying the motion to dismiss on July 22, 1965,
the appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus
based on denial of a speedy trial was heard. The
petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied (HCR

28).

Based upon the above facts, the appellant contends that he was denied a statutory and constitutional right to a speedy trial.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE APPELLANT PRESENTS NO BASIS FOR
HABEAS CORPUS ON APPEAL SINCE (A) THE
HABEAS CORPUS ISSUE IS MOOT, AND (B) THE
NOTICE OF APPEAL DID NOT RECITE THAT IT WAS
FROM A DENIAL OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

A. The appellant is presently confined at the
Utah State Prison. He is no longer in the custody
of George Beckstead, Sheriff of Salt Lake County,
or any other officer of Salt Lake Countym. Further,
the appellant has been convicted of the crime of
second degree burglary, and the same issue is
raised on appeal from his conviction as was raised
in the petition for writ of habeas corpus. It is submitted, therefore, that the appeal from the denial of
the application for writ of habeas corpus is moot
and should be dismissed.

B. The notice of appeal filed by the appellant

from the denial of his application for writ of habeas
corpus states that the appellant appeals from "the
judgment and conviction of the above entitled court
which was entered on the 27th day of July, 1965, on
the grounds that the decision was contrary to the
evidence and that hearing in the above case was
in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights
in the federal and state constitutions." The notice
of appeal does not recite that it is taken fro~ the
denial of the appellant's application for wnt of
(1)

The court may take judicial notice of the death of Sheriff Beckstead
and Judge Van Cott.
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habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding subject to the rules of civil procedure. Burleigh
v. Turner. 15 U.2d 118, 388 P.2d 412 (1964). Rule 73
(b) provides:
"The notice of appeal shall specify the parties taking
the appeal; shall designate the judgment or part
thereof appealed from; and shall designate that the
appeal is taken to the Supreme Court."

In the instant case, the notice of appeal does not
designate the actual judgment appealed from. Consequently, it does not comply with the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, and the matter of the denial of
the appellant's application for writ of habeas corpus
is not properly before the court. Sierra Nevada Mill
Company v. Keith O'Brien's. 48 Utah 12, 156 Pac.
943 (1916).
POINT II.
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED A STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY
TRIAL.

The appellant contends that he was denied a
speedy trial provided for by Section 77-1-8(6), Utah
Code Annotated, 1953. That section provides:
" ( 6) To have a speedy public trial by an impartial
jury of the county in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed; and every defendant in a
criminal action unable to get bail shall be entitled
to a trial within thirty days after arraignment, if
court is then in session in such county, otherwise
the trial of such defendant shall be called on the
first day of the next succeeding session of the court."
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There is nothing in subsection (6) of Section 77-1-8,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides that
charges must be dismissed for failure to bring a
defendant not admitted to bail to trial within 30
days. Generally, most statutes making a statutory
provision mandatory expressly provide for dismissal. See Note, 57 Columbia L. Rev. 846. It is submitted, consequently, that the above provision is not
manditory, but is directory and that an individual is
not to dismissal of the charges for failure to be prosecuted within thirty days from the time of arraignment, unless the failure is, itself, tantamount to a
denial of speedy trial.
Even so, it is generally recognize_d that the
failure to comply with statutory requirements for
a speedy trial does not entitle the defendant to dismissal of the charges or reversal of a conviction.
if ther ewas justification for the delay.
Thus, in Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, Vol. 5, sec. 1912, speaking of the right to a
speedy trial, it is stated:
"This guaranty is not given a literal inte~pre~tior_i,
and it has been held that the defendants right is
not violated bv the mere fact that he is not tried at
the next term of court, particularly when he consented to such delay, or raised no obj~ction to P?stponement or caused the delay by his own action,
or was ab~ent from the state. Delay is excuse~ when
the attorney for the prosecution was otherwise e~
gaged, or when other business of the court or climatic conditions require postponement when a continuance was properly.granted, or ~~en the defendant
was imprisoned for another offense.

8
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See also Abbott Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., -p.
252; People v. Bagato. 27 Ill.2d 165, 188 N.E.2d 716
(1963); 21 Am. Jur.2d, Criminal Law, Section 246.
This is, of course, a necessary corollary to the rule,
since, generally, retrial is not barred by the failure
to meet the requirements. Note, Dismissal of the
Indictment as a Remedy for Denial of the Right to
a Speedy Trial, 64 Yale L. J. 1208 _(1955); Note, 57
Columbia L Rev. 846, supra; 21 Am. Jur2d, Section
145.
In the instant case, the appellant was arraigned
on June 2, 1965. If it is assumed that the provisions
of Section 77-1-8(6), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, are
mandatory, rather than directory, it still appears that
there was sufficient justification for the delay, so
that a denial of a right to a speedy trial was not
involved. On June 15, 1965, well within the 30-day
period, the appellant's trial was set. However, because of other court business, specifically, that another trial ]:iad not ended, the appellant's case could
not be heard. The case was reset on July 2, 1965,
again within the 30-day period. However, at that
time, Judge Van Cott became ill and the case could
not be heard (R 41).<2) Up to that time, the only evidence in the record .of a demand for a speedy trial
is a contention of _the appellant that his counsel
. made such a request at the time of his arraignment
on the 2nd day of June, 1965. There was nothing ln
- the minutes of the court to support that conclusion.
A formal written demand was not filed until July
(2) Judge Van Cott subsequently died, which certainly indicates that
the illness was not an insignificant one.
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13, 1965. cf. State v. Bowen. 67 Utah 362, 748 Pac.
119 (1926). Trial was again apparently set on July
21, 1965, and at that time, the appellant's counsel
did not appear for the trial, although the prosecution
was present and ready to proceed. Trial was had
the same day as the appellant's petition for writ of
habeas corpus was denied. It was stipulated between the parties at the time of trial and at the time
of the hearing on the motion to dismiss the charges
because of the lack of a speedy trial that the delay
was in no way caused by the prosecution or the
fault of the prosecution, but was a matter of circumstances.
Under these facts, it is apparent that there has
been a showing of good cause for the delay and the
failure to meet the statutory time period, assuming
it is mandatory, rather than directory, would not
justify dismissal of the charges against the appellant.
In King v. United States, 265 F.2d 567, (D.C. Cir.
1959), a similar situation was placed before the
United States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia. The appellant King had been indicted and
was convicted of the crime of assault with a dangerous weapon. On appeal, he contended that he
was denied a speedy trial. The offense occurred
October 27, 1956. On December 3, 1956, an indictment was returned and on December 7, 1956, King
was arraigned. The case was set for trial January
14, 1957, and continued to January 28, 1957, on the
defendant's motion. On January 28, February 7,
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March 20, and April 15, 1957, the case was continued "for the reason, in the parlance of the courthouse, 'no court available.'" In speaking of the
facts, the court observed:
"Certain features of the foregoing sequence of
events are to be noted. First of all, the prosecutor
had no part in any of the delays. He never requested
or occasioned a continuance. Indeed it is easy to
imagine that the edge of his case might have been
dulJed by the repeated vain excursions to the courthouse by the eye-witnesses presented by the Government, the only witnesses (save King) in the case.
King has not claimed an inaccuracy in their account.
In the second place, of the seven continuances, three
were on King's behalf; of the 140 days which elapsed,
some 60 days of delay were requested or occasioned
by King himself. In the third place, King does not
allege any prejudice by reason of the delay. As we
have noted, there were a number of eyewitnesses; the
accounts of all, including King, tallied substantially,
no one denied that King cut Smith. The only issue was whether the cutting of Smith was pure accident or the result of a furious, blind slashing about.
No doubt this problem lies at a spot where the ideal
clashes head-on with the practical. Ideally, maybe
every accused person would be indicted or released
the day he is arrested and, if indicted, however,
would not be deemed ideal by those indicted persons whose interests are best served by delay, -and
there are doubtless many such. In any event practicalities prevent any such Utopia - if it be Utopia.
Lawyers often need time for preparation, and witnesses frequently need to be found and, when found,
must have advance notice to attend. Moreover,
cases have to take their tum. The case on trial is
entitled to d2liberate consideration; the others on
the calendar stack up. At the same time, too ~uc?
heed to practicalities may encroach upon the md1-
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:idual's rights. If the legislature were to refuse to
~ns~a~l sufficient judicial machinery to perform the
JUd1c1al tasks, it might be necessary to turn some
accused persons loose. But the present situation is
far from that hypothetical crisis. The problem here
is to dispose of the present number of criminal
cases through use of a reasonable amount of judicial
machinery. A method of disposition which reasonably accommodates practicalities is not illegal.
We think the delay here (a total of 140 days 60 days
of which was requested by defense counsel) 'between
arraignment and trial, on account of a crowded
calendar, is not such a prolonged period as to be
denial of speedy trial in a constitutional sense. The
fact that the rlalay was in successive bits instead of
by one long postponement is immaterial to the problem of constitutionality, where the off-and-on program has no harmful impact on defense witnesses ...
In any procedural practice short of the trial, it is
easy to find some element which could be called
illegal. But, where a method is chosen because it
meets the practical problems of a court and is clearly
within the realm of the reasonable, we do not advance the cause of justice by harsh condemnation.
We have neither the data nor the means with which
to devise another method of putting an average of
five new cases a day on the District Court's calendar. Sometimes we are compelled to declare a procedural practice void without even considering possible alternates; we do not feel so compelled here.
We do suggest that the District Court give the problem continui!lg attention, especially in respect of
defendants held in jail.

Indeed we werf told at oral argument that experimental variations from the practice here involved
were then already under way. We find no rev.ersible
error in this phase of the present case, despite the
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earnest and intelligent presentation by counsel who
undertook this duty at the court's behest."

The California courts have clearly recognized
that good cause justifies the failure to comply with
the time periods set forth for trial under Sections
1381 and 1382 of the California Penal Code.<3> People v. Rucker, 121 Cal.App. 361, 8 P.Zd 938.
In State v. Squier, 56 Nev. 386, 54 P.Zd 227 (1936),
the defendant claimed denial of a speedy trial. The
date of the crime was May 17, 1934, and the information filed June 9, 1934. Arraignment was on June
25, 1934. July 9, 1934, was set for the date of the
trial. On July 3, 1934, the court on its own motion,
because of congested calendar, continued the trial
until September 17, 1934. The court noted that the
defendant had at this time demanded a speedy
trial and accepted to the order continuing the matter until September 17, 1934. Extremely hot weather,
lack of court facilitie5, and a congested calendar
were the reasons for the continuation. The contention was made that the failure to try the defendant violated the provisions of 1194 Nevada
Compiled Laws. The Nevada Supreme Court determined that there was no violation of any constitutional or statutory right. The court stated that the
fact other cases arose necessitating the continuance
and the lack of appropriate courtroom facilities to
(3) Research has not disclosed a statute comparable to that in Utah.
Most of the time periods are substantially longer and expressly
provided for dismissal, in the event of failure to go to trial during
the time period. Good cause is usually deemed an excuse for failure
to comply wifu the statutory period. Note, 57 Columbia L. Rev. 846.
cf. People v. Bagato_ 27 ID.2d 165, 188 N.E.2d 716 (1963).
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accommodate a jury in hot weather were sufficient
justification for the delay.
In State v. Churchill, 82 Ariz. 875, 313 P.2d 753
(1957), the Arizona Supreme Court was concerned
with whether the failure to bring the defendant to
trial within a 60-day period described by Rule 236
of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, formerly Section 1274 of the Arizona Penal Code. The
Arizona court indicated that the rule provision,
which expressly provided for dismissal, required
the case to be dismissed "unless good cause is
shown." In the Churchill case, a minute entry reflected that there were judges absent from the
county which prevented the case from being tried
within the 60-day period and an especially heavy
work load. The court ruled that the absence of trir~l
judges in the county justified the delay. The court
said that before a defendant was entitled to dismissal under the provisions of Rule 236, he "must
bring himself within the spirit and intention of the
rule." The court said:
"The principal purpose being not to allow the guilty
to escape upon technicalities, but to shield the innocent by preventing unnecessary and unreasona~le
delays. Good cause means substantial reason; that is,
one that affords a legal excuse."

See also Castle v. State, 143 N.E.2d 570 (Ind. 1957);
People v. Denuyl. 320 Mich. 477, 31 N.W.2d 699
(1948); State v. Werner. 105 N.W.2d 668 (S.D. 1960).
All of the above cases support the proposition
that in factual situations similar to the instant case,
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the appellant cannot contend that he should be
relieved from a conviction for failure to comply with
a statutory request that a trial be had within a particular period of time.
In the case of State v. Endsley, 19 Utah 478,
57 Pac. 430 (1899), the Utah Supreme Court noted
that a defendant could have his case dismissed
under Section 5065 of the Revised Statutes of 1898,
it was necessary for him to prove that he was entitled to dismissal. The court said:
"Doubtless, by this statute, the legislature intended
to secure to every defendant in a criminal prosecution
a speedy trial, in the absence of good cause being
shown for delay.***"

Since good cause appeared in the instant case.
even though a different statute was involved, the
appellant is not entitled to acquittal on the charges.
In State v. Kuhnhausen, 201 Ore. 478, 272 P.2d
225 (1954), the Oregon Supreme Court had before it
a similar issue to that now before this court. Oregon Revised Statutes, Section 134-10, provided that
a defendant who is not brought to trial at the appropriate term of court was entitled to have charges
dismissed. The Oregon court ruled that there was
both a statutory and a constitutional right to a
speedy trial to avoid oppressive delay. The Oregon court ruled that the statutory provision was
merely an enactment pursuant to the constitutional
provision. The court ruled that dismissal would
only lie if there was no cause sufficient to support

the delay. The court indicated that the congestion
of the trial docket was a sufficient basis for the delay. The opinion is well documented with substantial authority and able reasoning.
Applying the above case law to the relevant
Utah statute, it is apparent that there is no statutory
basis for the release of the appellant.
The appellant's contention that he is entitled
to release because of an inordinate delay resulting
in the violation of his constitutional rights is equally
without merit. The provisions of the Federal Constitution in Amendment VI requiring a speedy trial
have not as yet been incorporated in the due process clause of the XIVth Amendment against the
states. However, the Federal Constitution undoubtedly would be violated if some specific prejudice
resulted from unconscionable delay. 21 Am. Jur.2d,
Criminal Law, Section 241. In any event, Article L
Section 12, of the Constitution of the State of Utah
guarantees that an accused shall have the right
to a speedy trial.
In State v. Mathis. 7 U.2d 100, 319 P.2d 134 (1957)
this court stated with reference to the state constitutional demand:
" 'Speedy trial' as used in our Constit~tion and statutes is necessarily a somewhat flexible term. It
must be interpreted and applied in accordanc~ with
the practical exigencies to be encountere~ m the
handling of the business of the courts. Desirable. as
it may be to accommodate those accused of crnne
with expeditious procedures, which the courts are
usually anxiom to do, a defendant cannot demand
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the impossible, nor should he be permitted to take
advantage of an adverse situation and insist that the
the charge against him be dismissed because of the
unexpected absence of a key witness, when it appears that the witness would be available within a
reasonable time. It would be high handed and severe to refuse a continuance to either side caught in
such circumstances.
The law is, or at least those who devote their lives
to it like to think it is, the embodiment of reason
and good sense. The duty of the court in administering justice carries deeper responsibilities than presiding over a game of tricks. This would be the result
of arbitrarily dismissing an action when one counsel
finds himself in a position of disadvantage because of
the unexpected absence of an important witness.
Experience te'.lches that in the arranging of trials
and the marshalling of witnesses, sometimes either
the prosecution or the defense may inadvertently
find itself um1ble safely to proceed to trial. While
diligence in preparation should be insisted upon, the
courts necessarily must be somewhat indulgent of
perplexing situations which arise, to the end that
both sides have a fair opportunity to present their
respective cases."

The meaning of speedy trial is not a term fixed according to absolute rules and regulations, but is
primarily directed to holding the defendant free
from vexatious, capricious, or oppressive delays.
21 Am. Jur.2d, Criminal Law, Section 243. The mere
lapse of time does not necessarily mean that a defendant has been denied a speedy trial. Generally, there must be some vexatiousness or capriciousness which interferes with the proper administration
of justice. 21 Am. Jur.2d, Criminal Law, SecHon 251.
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In State v. Hartman. 136 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. 1965),
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a fivemonth delay between the time of arrest and the
time of prosecution where the defendant was unable to make bail would not, in and of itself, constitute a denial of the right to a speedy trial. The
court said there was no showing of any prejudice
or vexatiousness to the injury of the defendant and,
therefore, no violation of his constitutional rights.
Federal courts have required a substantially grea~
er showing of unwarranted delay before finding a
constitutional violation than can be claimed in the
instant case. Thus, it has been stated that the right
to a speedy trial "is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances." Beavers v. Haubert. 198 U.S. 77 (1905)·
Corbin, Constitution of the United States of America Anno. (1963), pp. 1000, 1001. Research has disclosed no case comparable to the fact situation in
the instant case, where an appellate court has concluded that a defendant has been denied his constitutional rights to a speedy trial.
Recently, in United States v. Ewell. U.S. 34 L.W.
3154, February 23, 1966, the United States Supreme
Court considered the question of whether a defendant was denied a constitutional right to a speedy
trial. It appeared that the appellee had been convicted of selling narcotics under a federal statute
in 1962. In 1963, Ewell filed a motion to vacate his
conviction, which was granted in April of 1964.
Ewell was then rearrested and new complaints is.-
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sued, reindicting the defendant on June 15, 1964.
The government dismissed some of the charges
on which Ewell had been originally convicted and
prosecuted on one charge that had been known
to it at the time of the original charges. The trial
court dismissed the new complaint and the United
States Supreme Court reversed. The court stated:
"We cannot agree that the charge of 19 months between the original arrest and the hearings on the
later indictments, itself, demonstrates a violation of
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial.
This guarantee is an important safeguard to prevent
undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial,
to minl.mize anxiety and concern accompying public
accommodation and to limit the possibilities that
long delay will impair the ability of an accused to
defend himself. However, in a large measure, because of the many procedural safeguards provided
an accused, the orderly procedures for criminal prosecution are designed to move at a deliberate pace.
The requirement of unreasonable speed would have
a deleterious effect both upon the rights of the accused and upon the ability of society to protect itself; Therefore, this court has consistently been
of the view that 'the right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a
defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public
justice.' Beavers v. Haubert, 190 U.S. 77, 78. 'Whether the delay in completing a prosecution amounts
to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends
upon all the circumstances. ****The delay must not
be purposeful or oppressive,' Pollard v. United States,
352 U.S. 354, 361. 'The essential ingredient is orderly expedition and not mere speed.' Smith v.
United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10."
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Since the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 12, of the
Constitution of the State of Utah bear substantial
similarity, decisions of the United States Supreme
Court should be deemed relevant to the construction of the Utah Constitution. It is apparent that the
decisions from the United States Supreme Court
would not support a determination of a denial of the
right to a speedy trial in the instant case. Further,
those decisions are comparable to the position
adopted by this court in State v. Mathis. supra.
In this case, the appellant has acknowledged
that the delay was not the fault of the prosecution
and the record amply demonstrates only a smail
delay with no prejudice to the appellant. What
delay there was is attributable to the illness of the
trial judge, delays inherent in the handling of cases
and, to some extent, the failure of the appellant's
counsel to go forward at one point.
It is submitted that the record is totally unsupporting of the appellant's contention.

CONCLUSION
The facts of the case make it manifest that there
was no constitutional or statutory denial of the appellant's right to a speedy trial. Indeed, every effort
was made to expedite the appellant's case with
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reasonable dispatch to a final decision. The facts of
this case afford no basis for reversal.
This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
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